Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

Administrative Constitutionalism
Gillian E. Metzger
Columbia Law School, gmetzg1@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, VOL. 91, P. 1897, 2013; COLUMBIA
PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 13-350 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1807

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Columbia Law School
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group

Paper Number 13-350

Administrative Constitutionalism

Gillian E. Metzger
Columbia Law School

May 23, 2013

Administrative Constitutionalism
Gillian E. Metzger*
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration adopts a rule requiring tobacco
companies to include graphic images warning of the health risks associated
with smoking, defending the rule at length against the claim it violates the
First and Fifth Amendments.1 The Department of Education and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly issue guidance explaining how
elementary and secondary schools can voluntarily consider race consistently
with governing constitutional law.2 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in
DOJ issues a memorandum to the Attorney General concluding that the
President had constitutional authority to commit U.S. forces as part of the
NATO military campaign in Libya and did not need prior congressional
approval.3
These are three recent examples of “administrative constitutionalism,”
in that they involve actions by federal administrative agencies to interpret
and implement the U.S. Constitution.4 Indeed, despite their contentious
subject matter,5 all three are relatively straightforward instances of
administrative constitutionalism: the claims at issue involve well-established
constitutional requirements, and the agencies expressly engaged with these
requirements, relying heavily on Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence

* Vice Dean and Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Special thanks to
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Ariela Dubler, Willy Forbath, Vicki Jackson, Trevor Morrison, David
Pozen, my fellow participants in the Constitutional Foundations symposium, and to the Texas Law
Review for sponsoring it.
1. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,694–702 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF
RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html.
3. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
4. See Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the
Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (defining administrative
constitutionalism as “regulatory agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law”).
5. The D.C. Circuit recently held that the FDA’s rule violates the First Amendment. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The use of race in
educational contexts has provoked numerous Supreme Court decisions, with yet another case to be
decided this term, Fisher v. University of Texas, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (decision granting
certiorari). Although dispute over the lawfulness of President Obama’s initiation of the use of force
in Libya largely ceased when the Libyan government was overturned, debate over the proper
constitutional scope of the President’s Commander in Chief power and Congress’s role with respect
to military actions is long lasting and deep. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 945–50
(2008).
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in doing so.6 Such instances of administrative constitutionalism are a
frequent occurrence,7 reflecting the reality that most governing occurs at the
administrative level and thus that is where constitutional issues often arise.
But administrative constitutionalism potentially has a much wider
ambit. What about the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) recent final rule prohibiting both public and private housing practices
that have a disparate impact on racial groups or perpetuate segregated
housing patterns?8 HUD based its rule simply on the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) and did not discuss any constitutional issues the rule might raise.9
Yet, plainly, HUD’s rule could be seen as part of an effort to pursue the
constitutional goal of equal protection by expanding housing opportunities
for racial minorities and addressing continuing effects of past housing
discrimination.10
Does the lack of express engagement with these
constitutional issues in the rule itself preclude viewing it as a form of
administrative constitutionalism? Should it matter if HUD officials were
internally debating and considering possible constitutional dimensions of the
proposed rule?11
Or what about the actions by administrative officials over the years to
support and expand Social Security? President Franklin Roosevelt included
“the right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age,
sickness, accident, and unemployment” in the Second Bill of Rights he
proposed in his 1944 State of the Union address.12 The very need to include
such a right to economic and income security in a Second Bill of Rights
6. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. at 6–9 (defending Obama’s
decision to intervene in Libya on the basis of past constitutional jurisprudence and statutory
guidance); Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,694–
702 (justifying the FDA rule requiring warnings on cigarette packages on the grounds that it is
permissible according to the relevant Supreme Court precedents); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 2 (discussing the requirements of past precedent, including Brown v.
Board of Education and Grutter v. Bollinger, in the context of using race to achieve diversity in
elementary and secondary schools).
7. See Lee, supra note 4, at 804 & n.12 (enumerating several examples of administrative
constitutionalism and suggesting that the phenomenon is neither new nor infrequent).
8. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,479–80 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
9. See, e.g., id. at 11,460–61, 11,465–67 (describing reasons for adopting the rule and justifying
its interpretation of the FHA as encompassing disparate-effects claims in response to comments).
10. See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance
Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1193–94 (2011) (describing a range of efforts being
pursued to affirmatively further minority access to housing). The federal government’s authority to
force consideration of racial impact and to apply a disparate-impact standard other than to remedy
identified racial discrimination is contested. Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342–43 (2010).
11. See Lee, supra note 4, at 827–44 (discussing the Federal Communications Commission’s
(FCC) promulgation of rules requiring broadcast licensees and common carriers to adopt equal
employment programs as instances of administrative constitutionalism, notwithstanding that these
rules were justified on a statutory basis and the FCC did not discuss constitutional equal protection).
12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress (Jan. 11, 1944),
available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/state_union.pdf.
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indicates its exclusion from the first, and the U.S. Constitution is notoriously
bare of most affirmative rights.13 But Social Security has become over time a
core pillar of the relationship between the federal government and its
citizens.14 It is now “constitutional” in the sense of being part of “the basic
rules of political participation and citizenship, fundamental institutions and
frameworks for governance, and foundational normative precepts for state
practice as well as private behaviors.”15 Insofar as administrative processes
played a central role in the transformation of Social Security and other
statutory regimes into basic features of the nation’s political life, should we
understand these processes as instances of administrative constitutionalism
notwithstanding that they go beyond the requirements of the Constitution
itself?16
Finally, what about the statutes and legal requirements that create and
govern the modern administrative state? The Constitution identifies
institutions at the apex of government—Congress, the President, the Supreme
Courtand leaves the task of constructing the rest to the legislative
process.17 As a result, the agencies that make up the federal government we
know today, such as the Defense, State, and Treasury Departments or the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration,
owe their existence to statutes.18 The rules governing how these agencies
13. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363, 1393 (1984) (asserting that
“the rights actually recognized in contemporary constitutional law are almost all negative ones” and
noting that, in the United States, positive rights are largely recognized through statutes).
14. See William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
461, 468 (1996) (stating that the majority of Americans “consider Social Security to be one of the
government’s ‘very most important’ programs”).
15. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83 (2010) (advancing this characterization of what it means for a
measure to be constitutional and discussing Social Security’s normative entrenchment); Ernest A.
Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 412, 424 (2007) (arguing that
“[m]any of our most important individual rights” and basic institutions of government “stem from
statutes rather than the Constitution” and including Social Security as one example).
16. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 2–9, 12–18, 31–34, 171–92 (characterizing
the process by which the “small ‘c’” constitution emerges from statutory entrenchment,
administrative actions, and public deliberation as “administrative constitutionalism” and describing
how this process played out with respect to Social Security).
17. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 30 (2012) [hereinafter MASHAW,
CREATING] (“The American Constitution of 1787 left a hole where administration might have
been.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 576–77 (1984) (“The Constitution names and ascribes
functions only to the Congress, President and Supreme Court, sitting in uneasy relation at the apex
of the governmental structure . . . .”).
18. The War, State, and Treasury Departments were created by the first Congress in 1789, with
the Navy Department following soon after in 1798. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 65
(establishing the Treasury Department); Act of Sept. 15, 1789, ch. 14, 1 Stat. 68, 68 (establishing
the State Department); Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, 49–50 (establishing the War
Department); Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553, 553 (establishing the Navy Department).
The War and Navy Departments were consolidated in 1947, and named the Department of Defense
in 1949. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495, 499–500; Act of
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operate come from several sources, two central ones being the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and judicial doctrines that substantially
amplify its terms.19 Should this legal apparatus be considered part of
administrative constitutionalism, even though it is developed by Congress
and judges and framed as nonconstitutional law?20 Does administrative
constitutionalism also extend to our basic normative conceptions about what
counts as proper public administration?21 What about those administrative
features, such as procedures providing opportunities for an individualized
hearing or internal complaint and remedial mechanisms, that the courts have
held satisfy due process and other constitutional demands?22
All of these examples have recently been offered as instances of
administrative constitutionalism. All represent important dimensions of
American constitutional development and reflect the central role that the
modern administrative state plays in our constitutional system today.
Although administrative constitutionalism could be viewed as including just
the application of established constitutional requirements by administrative
agencies, I believe such an account would be too narrow. In practice,
administrative constitutionalism also encompasses the elaboration of new
constitutional understandings by administrative actors, as well as the
construction (or “constitution”) of the administrative state through structural
and substantive measures.23
Aug. 10, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-216, ch. 412, sec. 12(a), 63 Stat. 578, 591 (changing the name of the
department from the National Military Establishment to the Department of Defense). President
Richard Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency by executive action. Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 643 (2006), and in 84 Stat.
2086 (1971). The Food and Drug Administration traces its origins to chemical analyses performed
by the Department of Agriculture, but in modern form began with the 1906 Pure Food and Drug
Act. History, U.S. FOOD & D RUG A DMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ WhatWeDo/History/
default.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2013); Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(1906).
19. See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298–302 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, Embracing] (discussing the judicial
refinement of a doctrinal framework of administrative law through the APA and case law).
20. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 479, 490–97 (2010) [hereinafter Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law] (arguing
that constitutional concerns have animated judicial decisionmaking and the development of
administrative law doctrines).
21. See ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
27–28, 30 (2007) (defining administrative constitutionalism as a legal culture characterized by two
contrasting ideals: the rational–instrumental, guided by the principle of objectivity, and the
deliberative–constitutive, which relies on the judgment of individual administrators to maintain the
integrity of administrative systems).
22. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 487–90 (describing the
features of administrative law that connect administrative law with constitutional norms through
either direct compliance with constitutional mandates or avoidance of violating recognized
constitutional provisions).
23. As described in Part I, different scholars have offered different accounts of administrative
constitutionalism, with some focusing on agency engagement with established constitutional
requirements, others emphasizing broader norm deliberation and creation, and still others including
Congress and the courts as part of the administrative constitutionalism process, as well as agencies.
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Yet recognizing the divergences among these examples of
administrative constitutionalism suggests a need for some exegesis of its
different dimensions. Such an exegesis is particularly timely now, as
administrative constitutionalism is increasingly becoming a subject of
study.24 This attention to administrative constitutionalism is overdue, as it
represents a main mechanism by which constitutional meaning is elaborated
and implemented today. Given the dominance of the modern administrative
state, a full picture of contemporary constitutionalism in the United States
must include administrative constitutionalism—the constitutional
understandings and interpretations developed by agencies as well as those
that structure the administrative state itself.
Identifying administrative constitutionalism’s various forms highlights
the central challenges confronting it as a form of constitutional interpretation.
Many of these challenges derive from core separation of powers precepts and
constitutional principles of democratic accountability.
Administrative
agencies occupy an ambiguous constitutional space; they are barely
mentioned in the Constitution itself and owe their existence to statutory
delegations of authority from Congress.25 They lack direct electoral
accountability, with the resultant democratic legitimacy concerns often
countered by emphasis on political oversight through the President and
Congress and public participation in administrative decisionmaking.26 What
justifies administrative efforts to move the nation beyond recognized
constitutional requirements to develop new constitutional understandings,
especially if doing so means pushing at the limits of agencies’ delegated
authority and acting in ways not initiated by political leaders? A similar
issue of institutional overstepping arises when administrative
constitutionalism takes the form of judicial efforts to address constitutional
concerns raised by the modern administrative state through the medium of
ordinary administrative law.27
My own view is that administrative constitutionalism’s virtues outweigh
these concerns with unauthorized administrative or judicial action. In fact,
I mean here to offer a capacious definition that can accommodate the variety of approaches
described below.
24. See infra subpart I(A).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103–07.
26. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 469–503 (2003) (detailing different political
accountability models and critiquing emphasis on presidential accountability); see also Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1550–54 (1992) (emphasizing public participation in bureaucratic decisionmaking as well as review
by Congress and the President as responses to the accountability concerns of the administrative
state).
27. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 1543–46 (arguing that the judiciary lacks the
capacity to distill common public values and that the courts have no authority to require Congress to
change its procedures); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13–24 (1985) (detailing the separation of powers and federalism problems
raised by federal common law).
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because of these virtues, administrative constitutionalism can represent a
particularly legitimate form of constitutional development.
But the
accountability challenges it poses are real, particularly given the frequent
difficulty involved in identifying instances of administrative
constitutionalism in action. Agencies’ constitutional engagement is always
embedded.28 It occurs in the context of implementing programs and
enforcing statutes, and often agencies do not expressly engage with the
constitutional dimensions of their actions—indeed, these dimensions may
only become apparent over time. Similarly, courts are rarely open about the
constitutional or law-creative aspects of their development of administrative
law.29 Given administrative constitutionalism’s attenuated democratic
accountability, greater transparency about this method of constitutional
development is essential for its legitimacy—even though greater
transparency will also likely chill some agency constitutional engagement.
Administrative constitutionalism does not stand alone in crossing the
ordinary law–constitutional law divide. Recent constitutional scholarship has
highlighted the constitutional role played by ordinary law and the central
importance to our constitutional system of political efforts to construct
constitutional meaning.30 Assessing administrative constitutionalism thus
may hold implications for the constitutional enterprise writ large. Yet
drawing these lessons requires attention to the ways in which agencies differ
from other government institutions. As I argue below, one potentially
fruitful approach to increasing administrative constitutionalism’s
transparency is to encourage more overt administrative engagement with
constitutional concerns through the mechanisms of ordinary administrative
law. Similar exploitation of the ordinary law–constitutional law overlap
could occur in other contexts, for example by courts according entrenched
statutory norms more of a constitutional status. Doing so has the advantage
of linking judicial constitutionalism with its legislative and administrative
versions. Yet collapsing the ordinary law–constitutional law divide more
would pose much more of a threat to our constitutional system and to the
very practices of legislative and administrative constitutionalism it intends to
support.

28. See infra text accompanying note 83; see also Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law,
supra note 20, at 484, 507–08 (describing the linkage and reciprocal relationship between
constitutional law and ordinary administrative law).
29. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 534 (“Not only has the Court
not overtly developed ordinary administrative law into a tool for constitutional enforcement, it has
largely failed to identify the constitutional concerns underlying its development of ordinary
administrative law doctrines.”).
30. For descriptions of constitutional construction, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
3–6, 69–73 (2011) and Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–25 (2010) [hereinafter Whittington, Constructing], and see generally
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION].
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The Many Varieties of Administrative Constitutionalism

Administrative constitutionalism is coming into its own. In recent
years, a number of scholars have focused on the interplay between
administrative actors, and the national administrative state more broadly, and
constitutionalism.31 The attention to administrative constitutionalism is a
natural offshoot of current trends in constitutional scholarship—in particular,
the emphasis on popular constitutionalism, the historical evolution of
constitutional understandings, and the role that measures outside the
Constitution play in constructing basic constitutional requirements.32 Given
the post-New Deal dominance of administrative government,33 the
administrative realm is inevitability an important element in these efforts to
expand national constitutional horizons. Administrative constitutionalism is
equally a logical result of developments in administrative law scholarship,
which is increasingly focused on questions of institutional design and
internal agency structure.34 This focus leads to greater attention to what
actually goes on in agencies and how internal agency dynamics connect to
broader constitutional issues about the shape of the federal government.35
Politics and real-life events are a third potent factor behind administrative
constitutionalism’s rise. The birth of the national security state, marked by
expanded presidential power and limited congressional or judicial oversight,

31. See scholarship cited infra subpart I(A).
32. See Lee, supra note 4, at 806–10 (situating administrative constitutionalism in the context
of popular constitutionalism and departmentalism). The literature on these developments in
constitutional scholarship is vast. For a brief discussion and typology of popular constitutionalism,
and citations to the literature, see David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053–64 (2010). For recent leading accounts of constitutional change,
see generally BALKIN, supra note 30; ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15; DAVID A. STRAUSS,
THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The
Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007); Young, supra note 15, at 448–61; and see also
Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011 (2012) (reviewing JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) and DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010)).
33. See STRAUSS, supra note 32, at 122 (stating that “[t]he New Deal is famous for having
greatly increased the number of . . . agencies” that combined “executive, legislative, and judicial
functions”); Seidenfeld, supra note 26, at 1518 (noting that the New Deal encouraged Congress to
recognize the expertise of agencies and to turn the “expert agenc[ies] loose to regulate”).
34. See Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1363–64 (noting the focus on administrative
structure and agency design in recent administrative law scholarship); see generally Jacob E.
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333,
333–57 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (surveying public-choice literature
on agency design).
35. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316–25 (2006) (describing the need to
promote greater internal separation of powers in the face of increasing congressional abdication of
policy to the executive branch); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within
Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1038–41 (2011) (describing how power is allocated within agencies
and the constitutional constraints on that power); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 427–37
(2009) [hereinafter Metzger, Interdependent] (describing examples of administrative structures that
serve an internal separation of powers function and their constitutional implications).
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has highlighted the crucial importance of executive branch constitutionalism.36 In what follows, after describing several recent accounts of
administrative constitutionalism and the interplay of administrative and
constitutional law, I underscore a core precept that these diverse approaches
all share: a commitment to the constitutional character of ordinary law.
A.

Alternative Accounts of Administrative Constitutionalism

One prominent analysis of administrative constitutionalism is Sophia
Lee’s history of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)’s equal
employment rules. Drawing on internal agency records, Lee paints a detailed
picture of efforts by FCC attorneys and other administrative officials to use
the FCC’s licensing and common-carrier oversight as vehicles to further
equal protection goals.37 As Lee describes, these efforts—which included the
argument that the FCC was constitutionally required to deny licenses to
discriminatory broadcasters and carriers and impose affirmative obligations
to develop equal opportunity employment programs on those regulated—
went beyond judicial understandings of state action and equal protection.38
From this history, Lee concludes that administrative constitutionalism often
involves “[a]dministrators creatively extend[ing] or narrow[ing] court
doctrine in the absence of clear, judicially defined rules” and sometimes
selectively ignoring or resisting unfavorable decisions.39 Of particular note is
the way that administrative officials toggled between constitutional and
statutory bases for the equal employment rules, ultimately publicly justifying
the rules solely on the grounds of the FCC’s statutory obligation to regulate
in the public interest.40
Depictions of administrative attention to
constitutional issues also surface in scholarship on OLC, which is not
surprising given that one of OLC’s responsibilities is to assess the

36. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 87–95
(2010) (providing a historical account of executive constitutionalism as practiced by the Office of
Legal Counsel and the White House Counsel and arguing that these two offices increasingly serve
“to give their constitutional imprimatur to presidential power grabs”); Katyal, supra note 35, at
2316–19 (acknowledging the expansion of the modern executive branch post 9-11 and proposing a
set of modest internal checks on presidential power, particularly in the foreign policy arena);
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1691–93 (2011)
[hereinafter Morrison, Alarmism] (book review) (responding to Ackerman’s “oversimplified
account” of executive constitutionalism and suggesting an approach that places greater weight on
institutional details and how the executive branch works); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the
President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1403–05, 1408–16 (2012) (book review) (arguing that “an
increase in presidential power is not itself an increase in presidential defiance of law or presidential
lawlessness” and rejecting an account of law as at odds with politics).
37. Lee, supra note 4, at 810–36; see also Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The
NAACP’s Postwar Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948–1964, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 327, 334–36
(2008) (noting the role that administrative advocacy played in the NAACP’s efforts to pursue its
civil rights constitutional agenda).
38. Id. at 812–16.
39. Id. at 801–02.
40. Id. at 813–14, 827–36.
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constitutionality of proposed Executive branch action.41 Other scholars have
traced the role that administrative practices played in the development of
modern constitutional doctrines.42
The phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism also lies at the
heart of William Eskridge and John Ferejohn’s book, A Republic of Statutes.
They argue that “America enjoys a constitution of statutes supplementing
and often supplanting its written Constitution as to the most fundamental
features of governance.”43 These statutes not only fill in constitutional gaps,
but often transform how the Constitution is understood. A central claim of
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account is that the governance structures and norms
created by these statutes become entrenched over time through legislative
and administrative deliberation.44
And they identify administrative
constitutionalism as the process by which this entrenchment occurs.45 On
their view, administrative constitutionalism includes not just interpreting the
Constitution, but also “aggressive agency application of superstatutes to
carry out their purposes in a manner that is workable, coherent, and
consistent with the nation’s other normative commitments.”46
In Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account of administrative constitutionalism,
as in Lee’s, agency officials are norm entrepreneurs, advancing new

41. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1189, 1218–19, 1226–32 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Avoidance] (describing instances of
the invocation of the constitutional avoidance canon at OLC); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682–83, 704–17 (2005)
(describing OLC and the Solicitor General’s office as “the principal constitutional interpreters for
the executive branch” and providing details on constitutional interpretation in both). Lee’s account
is more unusual in showcasing constitutional reasoning by officials in agencies outside of OLC, a
theme that is increasingly emerging in scholarship on executive branch lawyering. See David
Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 22–24 (2012) (expanding the
analytical scope of the executive branch’s legal operations from OLC and the White House
Counsel’s office (WHC) to broader “civil service legalism”); Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation
Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 11–12, 11 n.37) (on file with author) (emphasizing that legal interpretation and the
formulation of policy are largely the work of thousands of government agency lawyers who play a
significant role alongside other actors such as DOJ, WHC, and OLC).
42. See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 574–77 (2007) (tracing the development of the
Fourth Amendment idea of communications privacy to early decisions and practices within the Post
Office); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of
the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 15–20 (2000) (discussing how judicial views of
administrative expertise and administrative censorship underlay development of First Amendment
doctrine).
43. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 12–13.
44. Id. at 7–8; see also Glen Staszewski, Constitutional Dialogue in a Republic of Statutes,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 867–70 (2010) (modeling Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account of
administrative constitutionalism).
45. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 33 (“[A]dministrative constitutionalism is the
process by which legislative and executive officials . . . advance new fundamental principles and
policies.”).
46. Id. at 24, 33.
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understandings of individual rights and the government’s role.47 Moreover,
these new understandings often involve administrative officials offering
creative interpretations of existing constitutional law and drawing on
statutory and regulatory measures as well as the Constitution. By contrast to
judicial constitutionalism, which they view as fundamentally “rule oriented,
definitive, and principled,” Eskridge and Ferejohn describe administrative
constitutionalism as “explicitly policy oriented, experimental, and
practical.”48 Indeed, they present the traditional, or “Large ‘C’” Constitution
as often operating mostly on the sidelines, with much of the focus instead on
these political enactments that they describe as the “small ‘c’” constitution.49
Although they emphasize actions by agency officials, their picture of
administrative constitutionalism is a capacious one and includes actors
outside the agency in a dynamic, interactive, and deliberative process of
constitutional development.50 Thus, social movements and legislative
enactments prompt agency actions that in turn “are subject to public critique
as well as veto by courts, legislatures, and other Executive Branch
officials.”51
Sometimes, however, the process of deliberation and entrenchment that
Eskridge and Ferejohn describe fails to occur. Anjali Dalal contends that
such failure is evident in the national surveillance context, where initial
administrative efforts to rein in the FBI’s intelligence-gathering abuses under
Herbert Hoover soon eroded and the current governing guidelines sanction
much of the activities that were at first condemned.52 Dalal argues that the
history of national surveillance offers a cautionary tale about the potential
negative effects of administrative constitutionalism, contending that the
combination of a powerful national security mandate and bureaucratic
resistance to oversight led to administrative narrowing of civil rights
47. Id. at 33; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 800–02 (highlighting the important—and
independent—role agency administrators played in interpreting the Constitution to support equal
employment rulemaking).
48. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 33.
49. See id. at 18 (“Without denigrating the importance of the Large ‘C’ Constitution, which
establishes the basic structure of our government and remains a potential path toward entrenched
commitments, we maintain that the small ‘c’ constitution of statutes is a better way to develop and
express our foundational institutions and norms.”).
50. See id. at 1–2, 23 (characterizing small “c” constitutionalism as the result of robust
deliberation and public discourse).
51. Id. at 33, 58–59. Eskridge and Ferejohn’s terminology is a little unclear; at times they
appear to use administrative constitutionalism to refer to specifically agency norm development, at
others to refer to a broad process including legislative, judicial, and public input. Compare id. at 16
(distinguishing “legislative and administrative constitutionalism”), with id. at 31 (“[a]s a general
matter, administrative constitutionalism is both the primary means by which social movements
interact with the state and the primary means by which governmental actors deliberate about how to
respond to social movement demands or needs.”), and id. at 33 (“What we are calling administrative
constitutionalism is the process by which legislative and executive officials . . . advance new
fundamental principles and policies.”).
52. Anjali Dalal, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Re-Entrenchment of Surveillance
Culture 14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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protections and entrenchment of these administrative views with little
opportunity for public deliberation.53 Others have cited recent events, such
as OLC’s initial sanctioning of waterboarding and other forms of so-called
“enhanced interrogation” during the George W. Bush Administration or its
conclusion, during the Obama Administration, that the President had the
unilateral authority to initiate the military operation in Libya, as grounds for
skepticism about administrative constitutionalism’s ability to serve as a
meaningful constraint on governmental power.54 National security is not
unique in this respect. Administrative constitutionalism can involve narrow
as well as expansive understandings of constitutional rights, and on many
occasions agencies have rejected a norm-entrepreneurial role.55 The FCC’s
prohibition on fleeting expletives and the FDA’s tobacco packaging rule are
two recent administrative measures attacked as insufficiently attentive to
constitutional rights,56 and the full story of federal civil rights enforcement
involves many instances in which agencies resisted assuming a more
aggressive role.57

53. Id. at 27–29 (identifying the current “surveillance culture [as] the product of an FBI
motivated by a powerful mandate and protected by the medieval structure of bureaucracy,” with
path dependency and historical practice serving to entrench the resultant administratively developed
norms despite a lack of broader deliberation).
54. See ACKERMAN, supra note 36, at 87–116 (discussing presidential claims to greater power
under the Constitution, focusing in part on OLC and the “torture memos” episode); Michael J.
Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion,
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.F. 1, 18 (2011), http://harvardnsj.org/2011/04/the-cost-of-empty-words-acomment-on-the-justice-departments-libya-opinion/ (arguing that OLC is not an “impartial,
objective, independent arbiter of the Constitution,” but rather an advocate for the President and his
policies); Peter M. Shane, Executive Branch Self-Policing in Times of Crisis: The Challenges for
Conscientious Legal Analysis, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 507, 515 (2012) (observing that the
“process of securing legal analysis [from OLC] after September 11 was anything but balanced,
dispassionate, and multivocal”).
For a more optimistic view, arguing that executive
constitutionalism is not so fundamentally compromised as to demand drastic institutional overhaul,
see Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 36, at 1692–93.
55. Eskridge and Ferejohn themselves acknowledge that “administrative constitutionalism often
goes off track” and detail several examples. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 305, 314–
15, 350–58 (identifying the development of the U.S. monetary system and antihomosexual
constitutionalism as instances of “administrative constitutionalism gone wrong”); see also FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 508–10 (2009) (noting the FCC’s narrowing of its
protection for the broadcast of expletives); Lee, supra note 4, at 855 (describing the Federal Power
Commission’s lack of interest in advancing broad constitutional arguments for the agency’s power
to combat discrimination).
56. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 553–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that
the FCC’s explanation for the change in its view of the constitutionality of its “fleeting expletive[s]”
policy is inadequate in light of First Amendment censorship concerns); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the FDA failed to meet its burden
so as to justify restricting commercial speech by not providing a “shred of evidence” showing why
graphic warnings on cigarette packages would advance the FDA’s interest in reducing the number
of smokers).
57. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739–40 (1984) (dismissing for lack of standing a
suit alleging the IRS did not adopt sufficient standards to deny tax-exempt status to private schools
that racially discriminated); Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 95 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding that
out of 113 school districts who reneged on their desegregation plans or were otherwise out of
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Another notable feature of Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account is that
administrative constitutionalism involves not simply promulgation of specific
constitutional norms, but also construction of the institutional and
administrative apparatus within which such constitutional development takes
place. Several of their examples of administrative constitutionalism, such as
the development of a national monetary constitution that includes an
independent central bank and national currency,58 are stories of institutional
development and entrenchment. Indeed, they note that “[t]he biggest change
in the Constitutional structure has been the creation of the modern
administrative state,” with the result that the “framework for understanding
most national lawmaking . . . is no longer Article I, Section 7[] of the
Constitution, but is instead the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.”59
Karen Tani’s account of the development of rights language within the
federal social welfare bureaucracy in the 1930s and 1940s is another example
of such state-creating administrative constitutionalism. Tani argues that the
New Deal federal welfare administrators used rights language as an
administrative tool to influence on-the-ground administration and helped
national authority enter spheres previously left for state and local control.60
This creation or “constituting” of the administrative state is more
centrally the focus of administrative law scholars’ accounts of administrative
constitutionalism.
Jerry Mashaw’s recent excavation of early U.S.
administrative practice demonstrates how “over time . . . legislation, administrative practice, and judicial precedent” led to “a set of constitutional
conventions concerning the place of administration in American
government.”61 Although referencing the “administrative constitution” rather
than administrative constitutionalism, Mashaw similarly highlights how the
constitutional understandings underlying the national administrative state
emerged from actions by agency officials and agency-developed structures
and practices.62
The basic doctrines governing judicial review of
administrative action are yet another manifestation of administrative
constitutionalism, though the main progenitors here are judges rather than
agency officials.63 As I have argued elsewhere, these administrative law
doctrines were developed by judges to address constitutional concerns raised
by broad administrative delegations and the attendant risk of arbitrary and

compliance with Title VI in 1970–1971, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare failed to
take enforcement action against 74 of them).
58. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 313–48.
59. Id. at 10–11; see also BALKIN, supra note 30, at 5 (describing the creation of key federal
departments, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and other measures as
“state-building constructions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
60. Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the
State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 320–23 (2012).
61. MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 17, at 285.
62. Id. at 7–10, 309–12.
63. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 484–85.
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unaccountable administrative decisionmaking.64 In turn, this constitutionally
inspired administrative law has a profound effect on how agencies operate
and frames our understandings of appropriate agency action.65
A fourth approach to administrative constitutionalism focuses even
more directly on the constitutional significance that courts assign to
administrative mechanisms and administrative decisionmaking. Institutional
features such as administrative hearings or review procedures are sometimes
constitutionally required, or are at least sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands.66 A prominent recent example is Boumediene v. Bush,67 where the
Court suggested that more expansive administrative procedures could serve
as an adequate substitute for judicial habeas review.68 But the potential
constitutional significance of administrative details extends more broadly.
Eric Berger has recently emphasized the importance of judicial deference to
administrative discretion in individual rights cases, arguing that the Supreme
Court takes an inconsistent approach in deciding when deference is
appropriate.69 According to Berger, the Court should pay greater heed to the
extent to which the administrative action at issue adheres with administrative
law norms in assessing the action’s constitutionality.70 On this view,
agencies’ political accountability, expertise, use of formal procedures, and
reasoned deliberations are all factors for courts to consider in deciding
whether to accord deference to agency determinations in constitutional as
well as administrative challenges.71
B.

Administrative Constitutionalism’s Common Elements

All of these examples of administrative constitutionalism involve some
relationship between administrative decisionmaking and constitutional
interpretation. But the nature of this relationship, and even what counts as
the Constitution, varies tremendously.

64. Id. at 491.
65. See Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, FLA. L. R EV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 32–35), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2143161## (highlighting administrative common law’s role in defining the function of
administrative agencies); Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1339 (“Requiring agencies to offer
contemporaneous explanations and justifications for their decisions creates internal checks on
arbitrary agency action, encouraging agencies to take evidence and expertise into account and
fostering internal deliberation.”); Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 491–92
(explaining that constitutionally inspired constraints on agency action lead to better documented and
more “technocratic” decisionmaking).
66. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 487–90 (discussing
procedural due process, First Amendment licensing, and Bivens actions as examples).
67. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
68. Id. at 766–67, 783–87.
69. Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in
Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2032–33, 2038–54 (2011).
70. Id. at 2036–37.
71. Id. at 2058–74.
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One central factor concerns who is interpreting the Constitution or
developing new constitutional understandings. Here the accounts of
administrative constitutionalism fall largely into two camps. In one,
administrative agencies or agency officials are the constitutional interpreters,
at least in the first instance. In the other, this role is played by the courts, and
what brings their decisions within the administrative constitutionalism fold is
that the courts either incorporate administrative decisionmaking in their
judicial constitutional determinations or construct the doctrinal framework
that forms an important part of the world in which agencies operate.72 A
second variable is what counts as constitutional. Some accounts focus on the
formal U.S. Constitution, including the familiar tools (text, structure, history,
precedent, practical effects, values) used in its interpretation.73 Others adopt
a more capacious account that extends the constitutional label to a wide array
of measures—particularly statutes, but also administrative actions and state
laws—that, like the Constitution, are entrenched, provide basic rights to
individuals, and constitute the government.74 A third difference is whether
administrative constitutionalism serves to develop the meaning of a discrete
constitutional provision or requirement that governs an agency’s actions, or
instead operates to develop the constitutional foundations and structures of
the administrative state.
Given this variation, identifying all of these different approaches as
versions of administrative constitutionalism might seem to expand the
category so far as to denude it of meaning. Each involves a connection
between constitutional interpretation and administrative action, but if that is
the sole definitional criterion then little may fall outside of administrative
constitutionalism’s purview. For example, distinguishing administrative
constitutionalism from judicial assessment of the constitutionality of the
administrative state would become difficult. Similarly, once the field of the
constitutional expands to include measures such as statutes or administrative
regulations, the line between administrative constitutionalism and ordinary
administrative decisions or policymaking begins to collapse.
One response would be to exclude certain of these approaches from the
realm of administrative constitutionalism, in particular by defining
administrative constitutionalism as simply encompassing instances of

72. Eskridge and Ferejohn’s account often gives primacy of place to legislative actors, which
would represent a third category.
This category predominates in many accounts of
constitutionalism outside the courts. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION,
supra note 30, at 225. But Eskridge and Ferejohn overwhelmingly treat administrative and
legislative constitutionalism in tandem, ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 33–34, and the
administrative–judicial contrast is much more pronounced in scholarship on administrative
constitutionalism.
73. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) (listing modes of constitutional
argument).
74. See Young, supra note 15, at 412 (describing these three functions as core aspects of a
constitution).
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interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by agencies and agency officials.
These instances of agency constitutional interpretation represent the core of
administrative constitutionalism and are easiest to distinguish from judicial
constitutionalism on the one hand and ordinary administrative
decisionmaking on the other. But limiting the field of administrative
constitutionalism in this fashion would achieve greater clarity at the cost of
unjustifiably narrowing administrative constitutionalism’s scope. Such an
approach would exclude not only judicial development of doctrines to govern
administrative decisionmaking, but also congressional enactment of statutes
that structure administrative governance and transform the relationship of
citizen and state. Yet these doctrines and statutes fundamentally affect the
form and substance of agency constitutional interpretation. Awareness that
their actions will be judicially reviewed affects the decisions agencies make,
and do not make, as well as the rationales and justifications they provide in
support.75
Agencies thus engage in their efforts at constitutional
development with a close eye to judicial constitutional views and how
agencies’ efforts are likely to play in the courts.76 Indeed, this relationship is
reciprocal, as administrative schemes also inform judicial understandings of
constitutional requirements.77 Further, as Eskridge and Ferejohn argue, our
contemporary constitutional landscape has been transformed by statutes, and
the norms embodied in such superstatutes permeate our understanding of
even traditional constitutional commitments.78 Moreover, given agencies’
primary roles as statutory implementers, these enactments—and the
administrative and interpretive frameworks that develop around them—are
similarly central to agencies’ constitutional reasoning.
In short, excluding either judicially developed administrative doctrines
or entrenched statutory enactments leads to a necessarily partial view of
administrative constitutionalism.
Equally important, despite all their
divergences these different accounts of administrative constitutionalism share
one core conceptual precept: an insistence on the potential constitutional
character of ordinary law and law implementation. To be sure, differences
exist even here. Some accounts preserve a distinction between constitutional
and ordinary law and seek primarily to relocate where this constitutional–
ordinary law divide is understood to fall—with Eskridge and Ferejohn’s
development of the idea of the small “c” constitution being a prime
example.79 Others, like Ernest Young, reject the effort to reconceive

75. The literature on the impact of judicial review on administrative decisionmaking abounds.
For a survey, see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 1006–13, 1042–47 (11th ed. 2011).
76. See Lee, supra note 4, at 801–02, 815–16, 870–72, 875–80 (describing incidents where an
administrative agency selectively ignored or resisted unfavorable judicial precedent).
77. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 507.
78. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 6–9.
79. Eskridge and Ferejohn are more complicated on this question than this description suggests
because they differentiate themselves from scholars such as Bruce Ackerman, who argues that some
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ordinary law as constitutional law, insisting that “[t]he fact that ordinary laws
perform [constitutional] functions . . . does not make them any less
ordinary.”80 Still others, such as myself, acknowledge the distinction
between constitutional and ordinary law but resist the notion that
constitutional law has firm or identifiable edges, particularly in the
administrative sphere.81
Nonetheless, this conceptual commitment to seeing constitutional law in
ordinary law contexts is what leads administrative constitutionalism scholars
to look at some administrative actions or administrative law doctrines in
constitutional terms. Nor is this shared commitment accidental. Instead,
embeddedness in ordinary law is a necessary attribute of administrative
constitutionalism. Given the Constitution’s silence on administration and the
fact that agencies only exist and function as a result of ordinary law
delegations of authority, agency officials’ constitutional engagement and
development necessarily occurs in ordinary law contexts, as they seek to
implement a statutory regime or presidential policy.82
Administrative constitutionalism’s emphasis on the constitutional
dimensions of seemingly ordinary implementation and policymaking,
combined with its frequent creative character, is also what links
administrative constitutionalism to the wider category of constitutional
construction.
According to Keith Whittington, “[t]he process of
constitutional construction is concerned with fleshing out constitutional
principles, practices[,] and rules that are not visible on the face of the
constitutional text and that are not readily implicit in the terms of the
constitution.”83 Whereas Whittington describes constitutional interpretation
as a more text-based endeavor to discerning constitutional meaning, he

major political developments represent constitutional moments and serve to alter the Constitution
itself. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 6–31 (1998). By contrast, Eskridge and
Ferejohn state that they “do not see the legal cogency or the political wisdom of routinely
converting landmark legislation into Constitutional obligation,” and insist that it should remain
subject to repeal though ordinary law mechanisms. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 64.
On the other hand, they also suggest that small “c” constitutional measures should get special
treatment in other respects, for example by being construed liberally. See id. at 465–68; see also
Young, supra note 15, at 452 (noting this aspect of their approach).
80. Young, supra note 15, at 414, 454.
81. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 512–19. Recently, Richard
Primus has argued for erasing the constitutional–ordinary divide further, contending that “we should
think of [constitutionality] . . . as a bundle of sticks that can be separated from one another, or that
can be recombined in varying configurations.” Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220995. On his view, “[n]o single attribute of constitutionality
characterizes every rule that mainstream American practice calls ‘constitutional’” and “no attribute
associated with constitutionality . . . is either necessary or sufficient for a rule’s exhibiting any other
characteristic of constitutional rules.” Id. at 4.
82. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 17–18, 24, 166–67 (describing administrators
as engaged in a process of developing and entrenching new constitutional understandings).
83. Whittington, Constructing, supra note 30, at 120.
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portrays constitutional construction as involving an appeal to “[s]omething
external to the text—whether political principle, social interest, or partisan
considerations,” and occurring primarily in political contexts.84 Jack Balkin
similarly contrasts constitutional construction, which he defines as
“implementing and applying the Constitution” to “build out the American
state over time,” with more narrow efforts at ascertaining linguistic
meaning.85 Although identifying “acts . . . by executive officials and
legislatures, both at national and local levels,” as the prime source of this
state-building process, Balkin underscores that constitutional construction is
an activity engaged in by courts as well.86 “All three branches of government
build institutions and create laws and doctrines that serve constitutional
purposes, that perform constitutional functions, or that reconfigure the
relationships among the branches of the federal government, the states, and
civil society.”87 Scholars of popular constitutionalism similarly have
underscored that it transforms “many things we are used to thinking of as
questions of ordinary law or policy . . . [into] constitutional questions.”88
Much constitutional construction thus occurs, like administrative
constitutionalism, outside the traditionally identified confines of constitutional law. It involves enactments like statutes and regulations, or the
development of new institutional practices and norms, frequently through
political struggles.89 Even constitutional construction’s judicial manifestations often venture into less identifiably constitutional lands, with courts
implementing the Constitution through rules of statutory interpretation, the
details of governmental procedures, and other judicially created requirements.90 Whether constitutional construction and constitutional interpreta-

84. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, at 6.
85. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 4–5. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–08 (2010), for a clear and more precise discussion of
the difference between interpretation and construction.
86. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 17.
87. Id. at 5.
88. David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2006); see also Pozen, supra note 32, at 2059 (“Presidential rhetoric
about the proper role of judges, newspaper editorials blasting the latest Supreme Court decision,
street protests about social conditions—each of these acts may be of constitutional dimension.”).
89. See generally WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30 (analyzing
the impeachments of President Andrew Johnson and Associate Justice Samuel Chase, the
nullification crisis, and the Watergate crisis as instances of constitutional construction).
90. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5–7, 37–41 (2001)
(citing examples of overenforcement—the requirement of Miranda warnings—and underenforcement—the “some evidence” standard of due process—of the Constitution’s meaning as proper
implementations of the Constitution); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decisional Rules, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1, 9, 88–100 (2004) (discussing the legitimacy of “constitutional decision rules” and what
criteria should be used in creating them); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 19–23 (1975) ("[A] surprising
amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as
something of a quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
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tion are truly distinct enterprises is a matter of debate,91 but the more
important point is recognition of the creative and ordinary law character of
some efforts to develop constitutional meaning: “The political branches build
out the Constitution through everyday politics. . . . This means that in
practice it is useless to try to draw clear boundaries between activities that in
hindsight we would label constitutional construction and ordinary political
activity.”92 Administrative constitutionalism represents a similar effort, and
indeed stands as a prime example of constitutional construction.
A second motif that runs through many of these accounts of
administrative constitutionalism is lack of transparency. In some instances,
the constitutional dimensions of agency decisionmaking are clearly
apparentas, for example, in the recent tobacco rule, DOJ’s educational
guidance, or OLC’s Libya Memorandum.93
Often, however, public
acknowledgement of these constitutional aspects is limited, with the agency
presenting its action in less contentious statutory or regulatory terms. As Lee
notes, “the Constitution’s influence often occurred behind the scenes in interagency comments and intra-agency memoranda.”94 Constitutional justifications and arguments raised during internal executive branch discussion were
often omitted from publicly released documents.95 A similar lack of
transparency is evident in the judicial doctrines and decisions that contribute
to administrative constitutionalism, which rarely acknowledgeand sometimes expressly denytheir constitutional underpinnings.96
provisions . . . .”). Also see Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 505–12, for
another example—administrative law—which I have argued is a form of judicially created
constitutional common law.
91. Compare WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, at 5–9
(describing constitutional interpretation and construction as distinct activities), and Solum, supra
note 85, at 95 (arguing that “[t]he interpretation-construction distinction. . . . is both real and
fundamental”), with BALKIN, supra note 30, at 4–5 (distinguishing ascertainment of the meaning of
constitutional language and constitutional construction as two different forms of constitutional
interpretation), and FALLON, supra note 90, at 5–7 (describing specification of constitutional
meaning and crafting of constitutional doctrine as linked aspects of constitutional implementation).
My own view, which will have to await further elaboration elsewhere, is that in contexts of actual
constitutional challenges, determining the linguistic meaning of constitutional text often involves
consideration of factors frequently identified with construction, such as norms, existing doctrine,
and practical implications. Put somewhat differently, on constitutional questions that matter and are
the subject of debate, interpretation and construction are rarely easily distinguishable. Cf.
Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1025, 1029–30, 1071–83 (2010) (arguing that identifying “interpretation” as a distinct activity
keyed to the constitutional text represents an effort to push originalism by definition).
92. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 298.
93. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
94. Lee, supra note 4, at 883.
95. See, e.g., id. at 824–33 (discussing constitutional arguments to adopt equal employment
policies made in an FCC 1963 memo that were omitted in its 1968 order and proposed rulemaking).
96. See Berger, supra note 69, at 2038–47 (referencing multiple cases with constitutional
underpinnings where the Supreme Court deferred to administrative agencies and other
governmental actors); Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1316–17 (discussing the reluctance of
the courts to recognize their reliance on administrative common law); Metzger, Ordinary
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Eskridge and Ferejohn at first appear an exception here, given their
emphasis on public deliberation as critical for entrenchment and the process
of administrative constitutionalism.97 But the public engagement they detail
often appears centered on statutory implementation and policy questions,
rather than being framed in expressly constitutional terms. In fact, more
explicit constitutional engagement may be especially difficult under their
approach because the small “c” constitutional aspect of administrative
actions does not become apparent until after the fact, once the new
understandings the agency helped create become entrenched.98 Balkin makes
this point expressly about constitutional construction writ large: “Potentially
almost all political and governmental activity could be constitutional
construction. Often we may only know what counts later on when
institutions become settled and practices and precedents become
established.”99
II.

Administrative Constitutionalism’s Legitimacy

The growing scholarship on administrative constitutionalism thus offers
a rich and varied account of it as a core component of our nation’s
constitutional practice. Rarer is sustained engagement with administrative
constitutionalism’s normative dimensions.100 To some extent, this may
reflect the view that administrative constitutionalism is inevitable.101 From
this perspective, validating administrative constitutionalism as legitimate
seems perhaps beside the point, with the prime challenge being instead the
descriptive task of demonstrating administrative constitutionalism’s ubiquity.
This descriptive task seems all the more important given the surprising
absence of administrative constitutionalism from most prior writing on
constitutionalism outside the courts, in particular popular constitutionalism
and departmentalism.102 Another contributing factor may be the diverse
Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 506 (“[T]he Court rarely discusses the constitutional
underpinnings of ordinary administrative law doctrines in any detail, and today often makes no
reference whatsoever to the constitutional dimensions of its administrative law decisions.”).
97. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 7, 16–17, 23.
98. See id. at 7, 33, 107–11 (arguing that “entrenching deliberation occurs over a long period of
time, and the norm does not stick in our public culture until former opponents agree that the norm is
a good one”).
99. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 298–99; see also WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, at 15 (“Few political movements achieve ‘overnight success,’ and a
low-level conflict over constitutional meaning may persist for years before culminating in a decisive
construction.”).
100. See Lee, supra note 4, at 886 (acknowledging the dearth of knowledge with respect to the
“principles and forces” that guide administrative constitutionalism).
101. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 303; see also Lee, supra note 4, at 804
(“[A]dministrative constitutionalism is likely a recurring aspect of the modern American state.”).
102. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 34 (criticizing popular constitutionalism for
omitting administrative agencies from its theories); Lee, supra note 4, at 807–09 (remarking that
both popular constitutionalists and departmentalists have failed to consider administrative
constitutional interpretation).
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character of the forms of constitutional interpretation placed within
administrative constitutionalism’s tent, which may make global normative
assessments seem of doubtful value.
Documenting the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism is
extremely important, in particular careful empirical study of the mechanisms
by which administrative constitutionalism occurs and its effects on
constitutional understandings. But so too is grappling with its normative
dimensions. Indeed, these two tasks are linked, in that one reason for the
dearth of attention to administrative efforts at constitutional development is
likely unease about the legitimacy of the endeavor. Moreover, recognizing
the inevitability of administrative constitutionalism leaves open the central
questions of how government and society should respond. Should other parts
of governmentCongress, the President, and the courts, as well as state and
local governmentsembrace and encourage administrative constitutional
engagement? Or should they instead adopt a resistant stance, one that does
not deny administrative constitutionalism’s occurrence but seeks to limit its
ambit and effect? The very breadth of administrative constitutionalism
forestalls easy answers but also allows for a more comprehensive assessment.
As I argue below, such an assessment reveals that administrative
constitutionalism offers important benefits to the project of constitutional
interpretation and implementation, and thus the proper response should be
encouragement rather than resistance.
A.

The Normative Challenge of Administrative Constitutionalism

A central normative challenge posed by administrative constitutionalism
derives from a core precept of our administrative order: the principle that an
administrative agency has no inherent or independent authority to act, but
instead can exercise only the authority delegated to it by Congress.103 This
principle follows from the Constitution’s vesting of legislative authority in
Congress: “The legislative power of the United States is vested in the
Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental
departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the
Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes.”104 On the
same logic, it also follows that an agency can exercise authority delegated to
it by the President, provided the authority involved is one that the

103. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority
delegated by Congress.”). For a discussion of this basic precept, see generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
2097 (2004). For criticism of administrative law’s emphasis on delegation as essential to
legitimacy, see William H. Simon, Democracy and Organization: The Further Reformation of
American Administrative Law 7–11 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Grp., Paper No. 12-322, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2175121.
104. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
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Constitution vests in the Presidenta point made clear by Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,105 the famous Steel Seizure case, in which the
Supreme Court considered whether the Secretary of Commerce’s seizure of
the nation’s steel mills based on President Truman’s executive order was
justified either by an act of Congress or “[t]he President’s power . . . from the
Constitution itself.”106 But it is understood that agencies enjoy no authority
separate from that delegated to them.107
From this principle, it follows that agencies are bound to implement and
enforce congressional will, and a court will set aside an agency decision as
outside of statutory authority and arbitrary and capricious “if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.”108 To be
sure, Congress lacks power to authorize agencies to violate the Constitution,
and thus, the fact that Congress has instructed an agency to act in an
unconstitutional way does not allow it to do so. But instances in which
Congress directs agencies to act in unconstitutional ways are rare.109 More
common is the situation in which an agency has a choice of approaches, one
or more of which might appear constitutionally troubling or at odds with
important constitutional values.110 The question is thus whether an agency
itself can assert a constitutional prohibition as grounds for failing to adhere to
congressional wishes or instead should leave enforcing constitutional
requirements to the courts.
The concern is that administrative constitutionalism inverts the proper
constitutional relationship between agencies and Congress, in the process
granting agencies powers they cannot constitutionally possess. As Jerry
Mashaw has put it, agencies are constitutionally required to be “‘faithful
agents’ of the legislature . . . . Obviously, administrators who fail to pursue
implementation any time a constitutional issue looms on their horizon could
not possibly carry out their legislative mandates effectively.”111 Even if an
agency instead simply takes constitutional concerns into account in
determining how to act (as opposed to whether), doing so “may change the

105. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
106. Id. at 582, 585.
107. Debates surrounding the scope of agency authority center on discerning the extent of an
agency’s delegated authority and the proper scope of Chevron deference, not on assessing whether
agencies possess any inherent power. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27
(2001) (tying applicability of Chevron deference to whether Congress delegated authority to issue
rules with the force of law to the agency).
108. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see
also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (requiring the court to
determine that an agency decision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors”).
109. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 523.
110. See id. (arguing that the more usual context will be those where agency regulation may be
less effective because of constitutional considerations).
111. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 505, 508 (2005) [hereinafter Mashaw,
Norms].

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1897

shape of federal regulation and perhaps make it somewhat less effective in
Or, as Lee recounts,
achieving congressional regulatory goals.”112
administrative constitutionalism may lead an agency to assert constitutional
demands that go beyond what the courts have required or Congress has
sanctioned.113 The net effect, in these instances, is that the agency “would set
itself up operationally as the arbiter of the constitutionality of congressional
action. . . . Constitutionally timid administration . . . compromises faithful
agency . . . .”114 In some cases, the courts have emphasized the impropriety
of having agencies consider constitutional challenges in excusing plaintiffs
from the requirement that they exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit.115 Yet as even Mashaw acknowledges, an agency’s obligation to follow
congressional mandates does not mean that it can ignore constitutional
norms. Instead, it also needs to be a “constitutionally ‘sensitive’ faithful
agent, interpreting statutes within the overall context of the legal order.”116
Two additional criticisms of administrative constitutionalism are that it
encourages agency self-aggrandizement and “potentially usurps the role of
the judiciary in harmonizing congressional power and constitutional
command.”117 The self-aggrandizement argument rests on the claim that
agencies will read constitutional constraints on their actions narrowly, to
preserve their own flexibility and power.118 Thus, some argue that agency
constitutional assertions are particularly troubling when the assertion is that
Congress has violated separation of powers by trenching on the President’s
Article II prerogatives, given the executive branch’s self-interest in making
such a claim.119 But the claim is also made more broadly, as casting doubt on

112. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 523.
113. See Lee, supra note 4, at 816 (describing “FCC attorneys’ constitutional theories” that
“creatively expanded Supreme Court doctrine” by ignoring limiting language and by “relying on
loosely relevant precedent”).
114. Mashaw, Norms, supra note 111, at 508.
115. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1992) (noting the constitutionality
exception to exhaustion); see also 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.5
(5th ed. 2010) (discussing inconsistent case law on whether presence of a constitutional claim
precludes exhaustion requirements). California has gone further, adopting a constitutional provision
that prohibits state agencies from refusing to enforce a statute on the grounds that the statute is
unconstitutional absent a determination to that effect by an appellate court. CAL. CONST. art. III,
§ 3.5; see also Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 473–74 (Cal. 2004) (applying the same
rule to local public officials).
116. Mashaw, Norms, supra note 111, at 508.
117. Id.; see Pillard, supra note 41, at 717 (noting the aggrandizement concern).
118. This claim represents an instance of what Daryl Levinson has called empire-building
arguments. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 917 (2005) (describing “empire-building” as “government behavior . . . driven by selfaggrandizing motives”).
119. Compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Executive and the Avoidance Canon, 81 IND. L.J. 1313,
1317 (2006) (criticizing the executive branch assertion of the constitutional avoidance canon on
Article II grounds as an instance of “loaded dice”), with Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 41, at
1229–37 (denying that self-protective executive branch assertions of the canon are inherently
problematic, yet acknowledging they should trigger “special scrutiny”), and Presidential Authority
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agencies’ reliability as fair discerners of constitutional limits even when the
scope of executive power is not specifically in play.120 The concern that
administrative constitutionalism will usurp the role of the courts is closely
related to the concern with constitutional evasion. But the concern here is
also one of constitutional overenforcement and judicial displacement: that
agencies will pretermit the courts from ruling that a putative constitutional
claim lacks merit by choosing a course of action that avoids the potential
constitutional concern.121 To some extent, this criticism again reflects the
possibility that agencies will illegitimately invoke constitutional arguments
to deviate from congressional instructions. But it also embodies the belief
that determinations of constitutional meaning are a particular responsibility
of the courts.122
These challenges to administrative constitutionalism might appear less
pressing in the small “c” constitutional contexts that Eskridge and Ferejohn
elaborate, where agencies’ constitutional role stems from their aggressive
application and implementation of statutory measures. After all, here
agencies seem to be simply carrying out the responsibilities Congress has
entrusted to them, rather than compromising these responsibilities by
considering external factors. Yet the same issue of agencies deviating from
their delegated authority arises here, insofar as administrative officials push
their statutory mandates beyond the lines that Congress intended. Even
Eskridge and Ferejohn acknowledge some of the potential pitfalls of
administrative constitutionalism, noting that “administrators may be easily
derailed from their statutory mission by agency capture . . . . [by] vigorously
enforc[ing] a regulatory regime’s least productive or its seriously mistaken
directives. . . . [or by] tunnel vision.”123 Although they emphasize the
availability of the courts as a check on such abuses,124 the deference that
typifies many administrative law doctrines under which agency
policymaking and implementation is reviewed, as opposed to the
independent scrutiny generally applied to constitutional claims, may limit the
effectiveness of this judicial constraint.

to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199, 200–01 (1994),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm (arguing that the President should construe statutes to be
constitutional and “has enhanced responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach
upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency”).
120. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727,
755–57 (2008) [hereinafter Merrill, Institutional Choice] (arguing that agencies are often focused on
specific federal regulatory schemes, lack knowledge of constitutional federalism principles, and
may be biased in favor of exclusive federal regulation).
121. Mashaw, Norms, supra note 111, at 508.
122. Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 41, at 1223. For a more sustained defense of the
importance of judicial resolution of constitutional questions and judicial supremacy, see generally
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1359 (1997).
123. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 305–06 (emphasis omitted).
124. Id. at 307–08.
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In short, the concern is that agencies’ role as norm entrepreneurs fits
uneasily with a constitutional system that vests legislative power in Congress
and judicial power in the courts.125 Nor is this concern addressed by the
Constitution’s grant of executive power to the President and agencies’
location within the executive branch. Leaving aside whether independent
norm generation falls within the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed,”126 agencies are not the President, and presidential
oversight of specific agency decisions is often limited.127 The challenge to
administrative constitutionalism’s legitimacy thus bears a close connection to
the charge that the modern administrative state as a whole is at odds with
basic features of the Constitution. Those raising this claim note in particular
that the Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress, a
democratically accountable branch, whereas the modern administrative state
is premised on broad delegations of authority that are legislative in all but
name and are exercised by unelected administrative officials subject to, at
best, quite attenuated accountability.128
The resultant conflict with
constitutional structure appears only more acute if administrative officials are
engaged in a process of building out the nation’s foundational commitments
in ways not foreseen or required by the constitutional branches of
government.
In addition to these constitutional criticisms based on separation of
powers and constitutional democratic accountability principles,
administrative constitutionalism is open to attack on pragmatic grounds.
Administrative officials are not selected for their competency with
constitutional doctrine or their awareness of constitutional principle.129 No
reason exists, therefore, to assume that they will be particularly sensitive to

125. Dalal criticizes administrative constitutionalism on different but related grounds,
contending that agencies are too insular and unaccountable to serve as primary norm entrepreneurs
absent congressional oversight, judicial review, or substantial internal checks, which in the national
security context are often lacking. See Dalal, supra note 52, at 29–40.
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
127. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2272–74, 2306–
09 (2001) (describing obstacles to close presidential control and detailing expansion of oversight as
well as continuing limits under President Clinton).
128. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 155–58 (1993) (arguing that delegation in the modern
administrative state goes against the structure of the Constitution and the intent of the Framers
because it involves transferring legislative authority to an entity other than Congress); Gary
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237–41 (1994)
(detailing the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the Court’s willingness to allow broad
delegation to administrative agencies due to the complexity of the modern state).
129. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1172–75 (2008) (contrasting agencies’ expertise in statutory schemes and industry knowledge with
agencies’ imperfect understanding of constitutional law, which often leads to a disregard of
constitutional principles); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737,
779–87 (2004) (emphasizing agencies’ general lack of expertise and competency on constitutional
questions).
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the constitutional aspects of their decisions.130 Indeed, given that individuals
are often drawn to working at federal agencies because of a shared
commitment to their underlying missions, agency officials might be thought
particularly likely to privilege programmatic needs over constitutional
concerns.131 This criticism of administrative constitutionalism is geared
primarily at its traditional, or what Eskridge and Ferejohn would call Large
“C,” variant, where agency officials assess the Constitution’s import for their
activities.132 It is less relevant to small “c” situations where the constitutional
basis of administrative actions comes from the statutes and policy choices
they are charged with implementing, and with respect to which they are
presumed to have great expertise. But such implementation decisions and
policy choices are also the contexts in which agencies are most likely to
receive deference from courts, thus raising again the concern that agencies
exercise broad and unchecked power that allows them to set the terms of
their own authority.133
Finally, administrative constitutionalism in its judicial guise is also
subject to criticism. On the one hand, judicial development of administrative
law doctrines represents a form of federal common law, one largely
untethered from statutory text and not constitutionally required, albeit
responsive to underlying constitutional values.134 It therefore runs into
criticism as unauthorized judicial lawmaking, criticism lodged at federal
common law generally.135 A similar complaint could be raised against
judicial use of ordinary administrative law to encourage greater
administrative constitutional engagement, on the grounds that doing so
represents an unwarranted intrusion on the executive branch. Yet such
judicial encouragement of administrative constitutionalism could also be
attacked from the opposite angle, on the grounds that the courts are foregoing

130. See Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 120, at 755–56 (noting “[o]n constitutional
variables . . . agencies clearly fall short” and “know little about constitutional law”); see also Neal
Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation,
5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 571–77 (2003) (describing and critiquing this argument as a defense of
DOJ control of federal government litigation). I have argued that administrative officials may be
more sensitive to federalism and state interests than is generally assumed, given their frequent
dependence on, and connection to, state regulators. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as
the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2072–76 (2008) [hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism].
131. See Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 104–05 (2009) (explaining that “[a]n agency has a specialized mission”
that the agency staff is committed to and that this creates “a significant concern about agencies
going too far in pursuit of statutory goals”).
132. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 8–9 (describing administrative reliance on
the Large “C” Constitution).
133. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, Nos. 11–1545 & 11–1547, slip op. at 16–17 (May 20,
2013) (holding that a court must defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision concerning the scope of the agency’s authority).
134. Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1295.
135. Id. at 1342–43.
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their institutional responsibility to establish and enforce constitutional limits
on government.136
B.

Administrative Constitutionalism’s Virtues

Such is the central normative critique of administrative constitutionalism. But is it persuasive? My own view is that administrative constitutionalism is more likely to advance congressional purposes than undercut them,
and the same is true about its effect on constitutional structure and values. In
the end, this question of administrative constitutionalism’s effects is an
empirical one, which is why the increasing study of specific instances of
administrative constitutionalism is particularly valuable. My focus here,
however, is on offering a defense of administrative constitutionalism largely
based on its hypothetical effects, as well as its concordance with
constitutional principle and structure.
One initial point worth emphasizing is that agencies’ virtues and vices
as constitutional interpreters need to be assessed in comparative perspective,
more specifically, in comparison to courts. The real question is not simply
whether agencies will pursue constitutional concerns at the expense of
statutory goals or congressional constitutional choices, but rather whether
agencies will do so more than courts will. Equally important, agencies’
performance should not be assessed in isolation because agencies do not act
in isolation; instead, they operate in a web of “control relationships”137 that
includes oversight by Congress, the President, and the courts. Courts also do
not operate alone, being subject both to political and agency input in specific
cases138 and political and popular influence more indirectly. But these
relationships are more attenuated, and courts act more autonomously
compared to agencies. At a systemic level, therefore, the question is what
overall mix of administrative, judicial, and other forms of constitutionalism
is the right one.139
Framed in comparative perspective, administrative agencies have
several advantages. To begin with, agencies approach constitutional
questions and normative issues from a background of expertise in the
statutory schemes they implement and the areas they regulate.140 As a result,
they are likely to be better at integrating constitutional concerns with the

136. See Mashaw, Norms, supra note 111, at 508 (arguing that when agencies avoid
constitutional questions, it prevents courts from exercising their constitutional duty to adjudicate
those questions).
137. Strauss, supra note 17, at 579.
138. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that “a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency”).
139. I thank David Pozen for this point.
140. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (noting that “[j]udges are not experts in the field,”
whereas agencies are, and that agencies are in a better position to balance conflicting policy
interests).
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least disruption to these schemes and regulatory priorities. As I have noted
elsewhere, “[c]ourts may have greater understanding and appreciation of
constitutional values and principles in general, but they are less competent
[at] balancing constitutional and policy concerns at a more granular level.”141
Moreover, this same expertise means that agencies have a better grasp of the
effect of certain actions, and thus of their constitutional significance, than
courts doand greater ability to investigate and assess the factual bases that
underlie constitutional claims.142 The history of the response to pregnancy
discrimination by lawyers at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Supreme Court is a case in point. As Eskridge and
Ferejohn detail, the EEOC lawyers’ appreciation of the impact of pregnancy
discrimination on women’s careers, as well as their understanding of
Title VII as aimed at protecting women’s employment and of pregnancy as
inseparable from sex for equal protection purposes, led to the inclusion of
pregnancy discrimination as presumptively sex discrimination in the EEOC’s
guidelines.143
By contrast, the Court famously viewed pregnancy
discrimination as simply a distinction drawn between pregnant and
nonpregnant persons and not sex discrimination in violation of equal
protection or Title VII144—a view that Congress expressly rejected shortly
thereafter by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.145
The pregnancy discrimination saga is useful in another important
respect, in that it resists the assumption that agencies are deviating from their
role as Congress’s faithful agents in taking constitutional concerns and
values into account. No doubt, there are occasions where injection of
particular constitutional concerns may be hard to square with a given
statutory regime. But it also seems plausible that in many contexts Congress
would be willing to trade more vigorous enforcement for greater
administrative attention to constitutional concerns, especially if the agency
believes judicial trimming or invalidation of the statute on constitutional
grounds might otherwise occur. This is, in fact, an assumption often invoked
to justify judicial application of the constitutional avoidance canon.146 Some
scholars disagree, arguing that “Congress would very likely prefer the
Executive Branch to enforce its legislation according to its best
understanding of Congress’s intent, and then to let the courts sort out the

141. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 533.
142. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking,
118 YALE L.J. 64, 96 (2008).
143. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 30–32.
144. E.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137–38 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 496–97 (1974).
145. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 47–48, 56.
146. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 523.
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constitutional issues as needed.”147 But even this more skeptical approach
would still leave room for administrative constitutionalism if the agency
believed that Congress did in fact intend it to take the relevant constitutional
concerns at stake seriously. And the fact that agencies are often deeply
engaged in development and enactment of legislation may give them greater
knowledge of Congress’s approach to the constitutional matters involved.148
Equally important, administrative constitutionalism accords with, and
indeed fosters, our constitutional structure. The reality is that most
governance today occurs at the administrative level. Agencies often operate
under broad delegations of authority that grant them substantial
policymaking and enforcement discretion.149 Despite ongoing claims that
this arrangement is unconstitutional, it has become a hard-and-fast feature of
the nation’s constitutional landscape.150 Rather than representing yet another
manifestation of this illegitimate transfer of authority to unaccountable
administrative hands, administrative constitutionalism stands as a necessary
corollary of the reality of administrative government:
As those primarily responsible for setting governmental policy,
agencies should have an obligation to take constitutional norms and
requirements seriously in their decisionmaking. Such an obligation
can be inferred simply from the structure of our constitutional order,
under which the Constitution governs all exercises of governmental
authority and all government officials have an independent duty to
support it. It could also be seen as a condition of delegation. . . . [I]f
Congress has an independent . . . obligation to take constitutional
norms and values into account, . . . then the constitutional price of
delegation should be that congressional delegates face this obligation
too.151

147. Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 41, at 1222; see also Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 92–93 (making this criticism of the constitutional avoidance
canon generally).
148. KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 149–51 (2013);
Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency
Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 346–51 (1990).
149. See Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1322–23 (emphasizing the impediments to
congressional action that lead to broad delegations); cf. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s
Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 386 (noting the limitations on Congress’s ability to
specify answers to questions created by a given statutory scheme in advance). But see Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, Is Administrative Law Inevitable? 29 (Mar. 9, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6mx3s46p (arguing that Congress frequently imposes
detailed procedural constraints on agencies). See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1695–97 (1975) (offering different accounts
of why Congress delegates).
150. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 128, at 158 (acknowledging that broad delegation of
lawmaking power to agencies has become entrenched in both jurisprudence and scholarship despite
strong historical and structural arguments that such delegation is unconstitutional).
151. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 522 (footnote omitted).
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Put simply, in an administrative world administrative agencies must
become a locus for independent constitutional enforcement to do justice to
the principle of constitutionally constrained government.
Of course, the argument that administrative constitutionalism serves the
goal of constitutionally constrained government is precisely what the agencyaggrandizement critique denies. Yet this critique rests on debatable
assumptions. One such assumption is that agencies will seek to maximize
their power, or that their deep engagement and commitment to particular
statutory regimessometimes called administrative “tunnel vision”will
make them reluctant to give much weight to constitutional concerns that
could seriously impede their regulatory efforts.152 To be sure, the risk that
agencies will undercount constitutional constraints is a real one, and accounts
of administrative constitutionalism detail examples of when it has
occurred.153 But these accounts also describe instances in which agencies
have read constitutional constraints on their powers broadly and not sought to
maximize their authority.154 Agencies are complicated organizations and
they may not be inclined to downplay constitutional constraints in any
consistent fashion, particularly if agency personnel view such constraints as
advancing important policy goals.155
Perhaps more importantly, the aggrandizement critique ignores that
agencies act subject to judicial supervision. While judicial review may be
lacking in some contexts, such as national security,156 it is hardly the norm.
Far more common is for agency actions to be subject to judicial review—and
where judicial review is available administrative constitutionalism should not

152. Merrill, Institutional Choice, supra note 120, at 755–56; cf. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 526 (noting that administrative constitutionalism only
requires that agencies take seriously the constitutional concerns involved, not that these concerns
necessarily trump other factors).
153. See Dalal, supra note 52, at 14–23 (describing how free speech constraints have been
loosened in allowing the unregulated expansion of the FBI’s mission, the FBI’s use of questionable
methods, and the FBI’s use of an intelligence-gathering process “cloaked in secrecy”); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1559, 1567–73 (2007) (detailing flaws in OLC’s Torture Memo, including its assessment of
the President’s commander in chief power).
154. See Lee, supra note 4, at 813–17, 824–27 (describing efforts by FCC and other executive
branch attorneys to read equal protection requirements more broadly than existing doctrine
required); Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 130, at 2078–79 (noting that agencies have often
denied that their decisions preempt state law and arguing that public choice accounts of agencies
seeking to maximize their power are too simplistic).
155. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 31–33 (detailing support for broad
equal protection readings from EEOC attorneys seeking to advance women’s equality); Lee, supra
note 4, at 813–17, 827–28 (describing different arguments for broad equal protection readings
offered by the FCC attorneys and the FCC Commissioners).
156. See Dalal, supra note 52, at 35–39 (examining the lack of meaningful judicial intervention
in cases dealing with national security issues because of limited judicially enforceable rights,
standing hurdles, and the growth of the executive privilege); Pillard, supra note 41, at 692
(highlighting the courts’ deferential approach to cases involving foreign policy, national security,
the military, and immigration).
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affect courts’ ability to enforce judicial constitutional requirements directly,
by invalidating administrative actions that run afoul of constitutional
commands.157 Moreover, where judicial review is not available, and thus the
aggrandizement risk is at its greatest, administrative constitutionalism is all
the more important as it will represent the main means for ensuring that
constitutional constraints are enforced.158
As a result, administrative constitutionalism also does not undermine
the courts’ constitutional role. As Trevor Morrison has argued, in those
administrative contexts where judicial review is lacking or limited,
encroachment on the courts is not a realistic possibility.159 And again, where
judicial review is available, administrative constitutionalism should not
impede the courts’ ability to enforce constitutional requirements directly
against agencies when agencies violate these requirements.160 True, judicial
review could be forestalled if agencies forego certain actions out of
constitutional concerns. Yet such agency forbearance would seem if
anything a prime benefit of administrative constitutionalism, and in any event
the preclusion of judicial review in nonenforcement contexts is not unique to
administrative constitutionalism.161 Mashaw cautions that administrative
constitutionalism may also limit the occasions of indirect judicial
enforcement through constitutional avoidance and other constitutional canons
because agencies themselves might forego constitutionally dubious assertions
of authority.162 But it is hard to see such indirect enforcement as a necessary
part of the Court’s constitutional role, especially if the net effect remains that
constitutionally questionable conduct is avoided.
In any event,
administrative constitutionalism may serve to expand other forms of indirect
judicial constitutional enforcement, as for example if courts used their

157. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (noting the availability
of a direct constitutional challenge); Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 526
(noting that courts may invalidate administrative actions as unconstitutional). The availability of
judicial review may have an indirect policing effect as well, by making agencies unwilling to run
too close to the constitutional line for fear of reversal. For the classic account of agency fear of
reversal and timidity in the face of judicial review, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 225–26 (1990).
158. See Johnsen, supra note 153, at 1564 (emphasizing the limits of ex post external
constraints on the executive branch and thus the need for effective internal constraints).
159. Morrison, Avoidance, supra note 41, at 1222.
160. Dalal suggests that over time administrative constitutionalism can have a corrosive effect
on the scope of constitutional protections when agencies narrow their understanding of
constitutional rights, but, as she acknowledges, the national-security context she analyzes is also one
of limited judicial receptivity to constitutional challenges. Dalal, supra note 52, at 35–39. It is
difficult to know whether the administrative and judicial resistance to the Fourth Amendment rights
at issue are endogenous or exogenous phenomena; it seems at least as possible that lack of judicial
receptivity emboldened agencies’ narrowing approaches as vice versa. Id. at 40 (asserting that lack
of oversight by other branches of the government, including the judiciary, “allowed for the insular
agency decision-making and the norm entrenchment that followed”).
161. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that executive branch
nonenforcement decisions are presumptively unreviewable).
162. Mashaw, Norms, supra note 111, at 508.
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ordinary administrative law review to ensure that agencies take constitutional
concerns seriously in their decisionmaking.163
What administrative constitutionalism does reject is judicial
constitutional exclusivity, under which judicial determinations represent the
sole and definitive expositors of constitutional meaning. Instead, it is
premised on a principle of pluralistic constitutional interpretation, wherein
judicial decisions may impose constitutional floors but not constitutional
ceilings, and other governmental actors have a role to play in constitutional
development.164 It also rejects the notion that the Constitution has hard-andfast edges, such that what is constitutionally required is discernible,
determinate, and unchanging. Under administrative constitutionalism, the
focus is on applying constitutional norms and values in contexts of specific
policymaking and law implementationoften quite creatively and
expansively. Not only does the meaning of the Constitution evolve, but so
does the scope of what is viewed as constitutional.
Yet to my mind, these are strengths of administrative constitutionalism,
not weaknesses. Its institutionally pluralistic approach is a trait shared by
any number of other accounts of constitutional interpretation and supported
by constitutional text and historical practice.165 Given that courts remain able
to ensure agencies adhere to constitutional requirements, the complaint that
administrative constitutionalism illegitimately interferes with judicial
constitutional prerogatives is particularly weak. Assessing the import of
constitutional values or framework principles in specific contexts is a central
feature of political constitutional analysis, as is the ongoing elaboration of

163. This dynamic is evident in several recent decisions where the Supreme Court appeared to
scrutinize administrative decisions more rigorously because of their federalism implications. See
Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 130, at 2048–69, 2109 (arguing that these recent cases
indicate that the Court may “[be using] administrative law as a vehicle for addressing federalism
concerns”). But see Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 500–02 (noting that
courts rarely expressly acknowledge using ordinary administrative law to encourage administrative
attention to constitutional concerns).
164. Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226–27 (1978) (arguing that “judicially
underenforced constitutional norms should be regarded as legally valid to their conceptual limits”
rather than being only valid to the extent they are enforced by the courts, and that “public officials
have an obligation in some cases to regulate their behavior by standards more severe than those
imposed by the federal judiciary”).
165. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 30, at 17 (“Much of the most important constitutional work
does not come from courts. It comes from acts of constitutional construction by executive officials
and legislatures.”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1966–
71 (2003) (emphasizing the institutional differences between congressional and judicial
constitutional interpretation); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation:
Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 848 (2002) (“The courts are not the
exclusive interpreters of the Constitution, and often are not its ultimate or most authoritative
interpreters either. . . . The authority to interpret the Constitution is shared by multiple institutions
and actors within our political system, and tends to flow among them over time.”).
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constitutional meaning.166 The courts cannot legitimately claim a monopoly
on these activities. In like vein, judicial law creation, especially in response
to perceived constitutional concerns, is a frequent occurrence, and courts do
not illegitimately intrude on the political branches by pursuing this path with
respect to review of agency action.167 Indeed, given agency expertise and the
greater ease with which agencies can respond to judicial reversals than
Congress, judicial encouragement of administrative constitutionalism may
well prove less restrictive of political choices than direct constitutional
review.168
A last virtue of administrative constitutionalism is the feature on which
Eskridge and Ferejohn place prime emphasis: the opportunities it provides
for political and public engagement with constitutional meaning.169 Here the
contrast with courts is particularly stark. To be sure, federal courts are more
connected to popular sentiment and majority views than suggested by the
iconic image of federal judges from the civil rights era as lone defenders of
constitutional principle.170 But the courts’ relationship to public debate and
politics is often attenuated and episodic.171 Agencies, by contrast, are
constantly engaging with the public: with stakeholders and other parties
affected by administrative action, social movement groups, business and
industry associations, unions, and political representatives at all levels.172
They are in constant interaction with any number of executive branch
entities—such as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which

166. For descriptions and defenses of “living constitutionalism,” see sources cited supra note
32. For a critique of the weight ascribed to free-floating values and general principles in judicial
constitutional analysis, see John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2008 (2009), in which Professor Manning
writes, “When judges enforce freestanding ‘federalism,’ they ignore the resultant bargains and
tradeoffs that made their way into the [text of the Constitution].”
167. See Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1297, 1343–48 (arguing that “administrative
common law represents a legitimate instance of judicial lawmaking”).
168. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 531–33.
169. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 12–18, 27.
170. See BALKIN, supra note 30, at 19. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). For a traditional image of the courts, see generally J.W.
PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 134 (Illini Books 1971) (1961).
171. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1723,
1733 (2003) (noting that judges “serve long terms that may attenuate their connection to public
opinion and popular judgments about justice”).
172. This is not to suggest that administrative interactions are evenhanded, or that the public
broadly is engaged in agency decisionmaking. Recent scholarship has highlighted problems on both
scores. See Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-mail, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1345–47 (2011) (criticizing agencies for discounting mass public
comments on matters of broad public policy in rulemaking proceedings); Wendy Wagner et al.,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 99, 103–04, 151 (2011) (finding empirical evidence that “at least some publicly important
rules that emerge from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regulated parties, with
little to no counterpressure from the public interest”).
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undertakes central regulatory review, OLC, other agencies and expert bodies,
or inspectors general.173 Agencies are also subject to legally enforceable
requirements of reasoned decisionmaking and responsiveness, and must
demonstrate the basis for their decisions and how these decisions conform to
governing law.174 Of course, these features do not guarantee that agencies
actually serve as sites for broad public constitutional engagement. Agencies
might instead simply advance the policy priorities of political supervisors,
the interests of well-connected groups, or their own parochial concerns. Yet
these features at least offer a potential opportunity for greater popular
involvement in the construction of constitutional meaning.
III. Revisiting the Ordinary Law–Constitutional Law Divide
Administrative constitutionalism is thus not simply inevitable, it also
offers several potential benefits as a means of constitutional interpretation
and development. Put differently, it is a feature and not a bug of our
constitutional practice. The histories of administrative constitutionalism help
document its central role in constitutional implementation and constitutional
development. Equally important, however, these accounts offer evidence on
whether the potential benefits from administrative constitutionalism play out
in practice.
Here, a cautionary tale emerges. The two common themes of
administrative constitutionalism—its embeddedness in ordinary law contexts
and the frequent lack of transparency that surrounds it—create an
identification challenge. Distinguishing administrative constitutionalism
from ordinary administrative policymaking can be difficult.
This
identification challenge is not unique to administrative constitutionalism but
instead exists generally with respect to constitutional construction, which
often involves the gradual development of new constitutional understandings
through the guise of ordinary political debates and legal enactments.175
Defenders of constitutional construction have resisted viewing the
identification challenge as a problem, arguing that drawing a clear line
between constitutional construction and ordinary politics only matters “if
something important turns on being able to mark that boundary with

173. See Metzger, Interdependent, supra note 35, at 427–32 (explaining the significance of
these internal checks within the executive branch).
174. See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 75, at 926–38, 976–1010 (discussing the reasoned
decisionmaking requirements applied to agency actions).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92; see also Pozen, supra note 32, at 2060 (“This
willingness to expand the horizons of the constitutional raises an identification problem: How do we
distinguish genuine popular constitutionalism from simulacra or impostors thereof, ‘judgment[s]
about constitutional meaning’ from ‘policy-driven, constitution-blind’ acts of opportunism or
reform?”); Young, supra note 15, at 448–55 (identifying this line-drawing difficulty as the rule-ofrecognition problem).
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precision.”176 But they maintain nothing does, because the constitutional
character of certain ordinary law measures does not change their formal legal
status; they remain ordinary law and subject to repeal by new legislation in
the unlikely event that sufficient support for such a repeal exists.177
Yet the difficulty of distinguishing between the ordinary and the
constitutional seems likely to be more acute with respect to administrative
constitutionalism than other instances of constitutional construction. As
named constitutional actors, Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court
may have more occasion to engage in overt disputes over constitutional
principle or to develop their constitutional understandings expresslyfor
example, in order to gain interbranch acknowledgement or to counter another
branch’s constitutional claims.178 Agencies, however, occupy a more
constitutionally ambiguous space, and their actions are always embedded in
statutory and regulatory regimes. Agencies also are subject to multiple
relationships of oversight and control, and their incentives may be more
towards hiding the constitutional dimensions of their actions so as to avoid
provoking resistance to their proposed courses of action.
In addition, the identification challenge poses particular problems for
administrative constitutionalism’s legitimacy.
If agency efforts at
constitutional development were clearly evident as distinct from ordinary
policymaking and as meriting closer scrutiny by external actors, then the
potential danger of unauthorized administrative actions might be lessened.
By contrast, when administrative constitutionalism occurs in secret and is
hard to discern, legal and political oversight of the process may be stymied.
Perhaps the President will have greater awareness of the constitutional basis
of an agency’s decisionmaking, given the likelihood of broader executive
branch interactions, but that simply enhances the danger of one-sided
constitutional assertionsand revives the concern that administrative
constitutionalism will operate to the detriment of Congress. And, if agencies
engage with constitutional concerns clandestinely, there will be scant
176. Young, supra note 15, at 454, see also BALKIN, supra note 30, at 300 (“In sum, it is best
not to worry too much about where constitutional construction leaves off and merely ordinary
politics begins. The key point, instead, is to recognize how practices within the constitutional
scheme can subtly adjust the scheme itself in addition to the formal processes of constitutional
amendment.”).
177. BALKIN, supra note 30, at 311–12; Young, supra note 15, at 454; see also WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, at 15 (stating that arguments concerning
constitutional construction “never leave the realm of politics” and that even accepted constructions
“are subject to future political struggle”).
178. Cf. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 30, at 5–6 (juxtaposing
the concepts of constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction and arguing that the
latter is “essentially [a] political task, regardless of the particular institution exercising that function,
to construct a determinate constitutional meaning to guide government practice”). But cf. Curtis A.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV.
411, 438–47 (2012) (demonstrating how the “Madisonian conception” of interbranch competition
fails to account for Congress’s failure to systemically defend legislative authority against executive
encroachment).
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occasion for broad public constitutional deliberation. Lack of transparency
with respect to judicial contributions to administrative constitutionalism is
similarly problematic. By not highlighting the common law character of
administrative law, courts curtail assessment of judicial choices by the
political branches and undermine the public’s ability to hold courts to the
rule of law.179
But transparency comes at a price. Administrative constitutionalism
may well flourish best in the shade. The flip side of greater public
engagement is greater opportunity for political or judicial veto of
administrative efforts at constitutional development. And fears of such
vetoes may lead agencies to forego administrative constitutionalism
altogether, particularly administrative efforts to expand upon existing judicial
constitutional understandings. The recent HUD rule outlining the disparate
impact standard and methodology applicable to FHA claims is a case in
point. HUD has long claimed that the FHA encompasses disparate impact
claims, and describes its new rule as simply codifying that view and
providing clarity by specifying a proof standard under which such claims
should be assessed.180 On the other hand, both the availability of disparate
impact claims under the FHA and application of a disparate impact standard
to governmental actions like enactment of land use rules and ordinances
implicate highly contentious constitutional debates. In Ricci v. DeStefano,181
the Supreme Court left open the question of whether imposition of a
disparate impact standard with respect to race violates equal protection, as a
form of government-required race-based decisionmaking.182 A separate
question is whether application of a disparate impact standard to state and
local governments exceeds Congress’s power under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Constitution’s equal protection
guarantee.183 More broadly, the rule implicates the question of what kinds of
protections are needed to root out racial segregation in housing and its
continued effects.184 Even though the dispute over disparate impact in the

179. Metzger, Embracing, supra note 19, at 1356.
180. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460, 11,460–61 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (noting that in
adopting the final rule it was “formaliz[ing] its long-held recognition of discriminatory effects
liability under the [FHA]” and implementing a burden-shifting test to ensure consistent application
of the rule).
181. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
182. Id. at 584, 593; see also id. at 594–95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the claimed
constitutional violation); Primus, supra note 10, at 1354–62 (detailing the constitutional dimensions
of Ricci).
183. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (noting that one “issue was whether federal statutes prohibiting
facially neutral practices with racially disparate impacts were valid . . . as means of enforcing equal
protection under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
184. See generally Johnson, supra note 10 (broadly discussing the problem of racial segregation
in housing and proposed strategies to achieve greater integration).
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FHA context has focused on statutory authority,185 it is hard to imagine that
these constitutional issues were not raised in internal discussions at HUD or
within the executive branch generally. Yet had HUD publicly engaged these
constitutional questions it would have immediately situated the rule in the
midst of a contentious constitutional debate—and, given the Supreme
Court’s current hostility to race-based action, increased the chances the Court
might invalidate the rule.
The challenge thus is that the very means needed to ensure
administrative constitutionalism’s legitimacy—greater transparency—is
simultaneously what may deter administrative constitutionalism from
occurring. One potential response is to embrace the ordinary law–
constitutional law interplay more robustly, and use ordinary administrative
law scrutiny to encourage agencies to engage with relevant constitutional
issues.186 Doing so not only helps ensure agencies take constitutional issues
seriously, it also gives them an incentive to be more overt about their
constitutional deliberations, for fear that if they did not publicly engage with
significant constitutional aspects of their decisions courts might remand for
further consideration.
Perhaps as important, having courts address
administrative constitutionalism through ordinary administrative law helps
frame their review in more deferential terms and with recognition of agency
expertise, which might lead to greater judicial–administrative dialogue on the
constitutional issues involved.187 To be sure, in some cases agencies
themselves may not be aware of their actions’ potential constitutional
significance because their constitutional character may only become apparent
over time. Hence, using ordinary administrative law to encourage agency
engagement with and transparency about constitutional concerns will not end
the identification challenge. And courts might well still invalidate agency
actions on straightforward constitutional grounds. Yet this approach may
offer some counter to administrative inclinations to shield the full dimensions
of their actions while inviting greater judicial acknowledgement of the
overlapping character of ordinary and constitutional law.
Arguably, a similar approach should be taken to judicial review more
broadly and not limited to the administrative context. According to Young,
for example, the constitutional role of ordinary law suggests that courts

185. The Supreme Court recently sought the views of the Solicitor General on the question of
whether the FHA embodies a discriminatory impact standard. Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mount Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 569 (2012). The term before it had granted certiorari on
a case presenting the same question, but the case was dismissed on the parties’ request. Magner v.
Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
186. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 484–86. Congress and the
President could similarly require greater public administrative engagement with constitutional
concerns. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521,
570–72 (2012) (suggesting mechanisms to ensure better administrative attention to federalism
impacts from preemption).
187. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 484–86.
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should avoid drawing a clear doctrinal line between the two.188 Thus, not
only should courts address constitutional concerns through ordinary law
measures such as canons of statutory interpretation, but in addition courts
should resist according deference to agency views of statutes that perform
constitutive functions—just as courts do not defer to administrative
interpretations of the Constitution.189 Eskridge and Ferejohn reach a similar
conclusion about the benefits of addressing Large “C” constitutional
concerns through more ordinary law means like canons of statutory
interpretation, which can reinforce the need for constitutional deliberation.190
But they contend that the deference relationship should be reversed, in that
the courts should treat measures that have become entrenched through
legislative and administrative constitutionalism as precedents that should
guide judicial constitutional deliberation.191
I am more ambivalent about collapsing doctrinal distinctions between
ordinary and constitutional law so broadly. Such an approach has the
attraction of having doctrine map actual constitutional practice, as well as the
benefit of allowing constitutional law to develop in a more democratically
legitimate and dialogic fashion. But there are also good reasons to resist
erasing the doctrinal distinction between constitutional and ordinary law
across the board. To begin with, courts do not stand in the same relationship
to Congress and the President as they do to agencies. Judicial review of the
basis for administrative decisionmaking is far more robust, rooted both in
core administrative statutes and in constitutionally informed administrative
law doctrines.192 Such scrutiny is less justifiable with respect to decisions by
constitutionally coequal and more politically accountable branches. All the
more so given that the rationale of the courts using ordinary administrative
law to encourage transparency about administrative constitutionalism is the

188. See Young, supra note 15, at 452 (suggesting that there should not be a dichotomy
“between ‘the higher lawmaking’ entailed in the Constitution and ‘ordinary lawmaking’ entailed in
statutes”).
189. Id. at 467–70. Professor Young argues:
[F]irst, . . . where a statutory scheme plays a constitutive role in the constitutional
structure, courts should not hesitate to employ normative canons of statutory
construction that reflect the constitutional values underlying the relevant aspect of the
structure. Second, courts should be reluctant to accord . . . deference to statutory
interpretations by administrative agencies where the statute in question plays a
constitutive role.
Id. at 467.
190. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 24.
191. Id. at 434–36, 445–47 (“[L]egislative and administrative constitutionalism does play and
ought to play a critical role in the operation of judicial Constitutionalism.”).
192. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 490 (explaining how an
administrative statute’s—the APA’s—prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action
provides a basis for judicial scrutiny of agency decisions); see also id. at 496 (explaining the
Supreme Court’s strong presumption that Congress intended judicial review of administrative
decisionmaking and how that presumption is rooted in constitutional due process and separation of
powers).
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need to foster greater oversight of agency constitutional moves by these
branches.
Moreover, collapsing the ordinary law–constitutional law divide could
undercut core precepts of our constitutional system. Expansion of the
constitutional into ordinary law can lead to greater judicial assertion of
authority that operates to limit the political branches’ ability to “build out”
the Constitution.193 One recent example comes from NFIB v. Sebelius,194
where four Justices would have invalidated the massive healthcare reform
statute in toto, based in part on constitutionally inspired rules of statutory
construction.195 To be sure, these rules can also come to a statute’s defense;
Chief Justice Roberts invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in
holding that the requirement that individuals purchase health insurance or
pay a penalty could be sustained as a tax.196 Still, the very different
approaches evident in NFIB suggest that scholars’ concerns about these rules
as surreptitiously expanding the judicial role have some merit. Although
addressing constitutional concerns through ordinary law measures
theoretically leaves the political branches more room to respond, in practice
the effect can be quite draconian.197 This practical reality marks another
reason to distinguish between administrative constitutionalism and other
erasures of the ordinary law–constitutional law divide, as administrative
agencies are better situated to respond to ordinary law reversals than
Congress is.198 It also suggests reason to worry about the impact of applying
approaches like the constitutional avoidance canon to protect central
statutory commitments in addition to Large “C” constitutional concerns.
193. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 635–40 (1992) (noting the
unacknowledged countermajoritarian effects of this kind of back-door constitutionalization); see
also Schauer, supra note 147, at 92–96 (emphasizing the constraints on the political branches from
the canon of constitutional avoidance).
194. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
195. Id. at 2642, 2650–56, 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(interpreting the individual mandate to not be a tax and arguing that the only proper response was to
invalidate the Affordable Care Act in toto, rather than sever those parts that were unconstitutional);
see Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the
Individual Mandate, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript 1–3) (on file with
author) (noting the interaction of statutory construction and constitutional implementation in the
decision and the impact of different statutory construction approaches to constitutional principles).
196. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–600. Interestingly, the Chief Justice took a narrower approach to
the canon than is currently the norm, concluding that the measure otherwise actually would be
unconstitutional, suggesting his approach was more straightforwardly constitutional and less a
blending of constitutional and ordinary law approaches. Id. at 2600–01.
197. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 425 (2010) (explaining how clear statement rules, by placing an emphasis on additional clarity,
can effectively impose a judicial tax on the legislative branch, if that branch wishes to pass
legislation to “achieve a constitutionally disfavored result”).
198. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 20, at 532–33 (citing less
burdensome procedural requirements and unity of purpose among agency personnel as reasons
agencies better respond to judicial reversal).
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At the same time, collapsing the ordinary–constitutional distinction also
may threaten judicial constitutionalism. Deference to legislative and
administrative constitutionalism risks undermining the judiciary’s ability to
stand as an independent constitutional interpreter. It may lead both the
political branches and the courts to view the constitutional content of existing
decisions narrowly, resulting in an erosion of constitutional protections. As
David Franklin has put it, “there are advantages to marking out the realm of
constitutional decision-making as something distinct from the background
noise of political bargaining. . . . After all, if everything is constitutional
politics, then everything is ordinary politics.”199 Alternatively, the desire to
identify some constitutional core that transcends politics may lend support to
adopting narrow approaches to constitutional interpretive methodology, such
as putting primacy on the original expected meaning of the Constitution’s
terms, to counterbalance recognition of constitutional change.200
Hence, we should be cautious about extending the doctrinal and
normative implications of administrative constitutionalism to constitutional
construction more generally. Preserving adequate room for constitutional
implementation by all the branches may require tolerating some
inconsistency between lived constitutional practice and constitutional
doctrine. Ordinary law may function as constitutional law and constitutional
law may at times be indistinguishable from ordinary law, but perhaps this
reality is not one that the courts should broadly acknowledge.

199. Franklin, supra note 88, at 1074–75.
200. See BALKIN, supra note 30, at 3–7 (arguing that fidelity to the Constitution requires
“fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution, and in particular, to the rules, standards, and
principles stated by the Constitution’s text,” but not original expected applications); Whittington,
Constructing, supra note 30, at 120–22, 133–35 (defining interpretation as a process that attempts to
“divine the meaning of the text” and is intended to be enduring, and emphasizing how an originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation accords with recognition of constitutional construction).

